1. Political Transition Without Change

Five South Asian countries will hold elections in 2024, and most will likely return incumbent parties to power. Bhutan is not one of them: The first-round vote in November knocked out the ruling party, and two other parties will participate in a runoff on Jan. 9. (One of the remaining parties led Bhutan’s government between 2013 and 2018.)

Sri Lanka’s election, scheduled to happen before September, is still too early to call. Sri Lankan President Ranil Wickremesinghe hopes that his country’s economic improvements this year will help catapult him to victory, but many Sri Lankans still resent his ties to his unpopular predecessor, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who was ousted in 2022.

The region’s other elections look more certain. With Bangladesh’s largest opposition party boycotting elections on Jan. 7 due to concerns about vote rigging, the ruling Awami League party will likely return to government for a fourth straight term. In Pakistan, harsh crackdowns on the opposition, including the jailing of leader Imran Khan, have advantaged the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz party—which led the last governing coalition before the current caretaker government took over in August—ahead of election day on Feb. 8.

In India, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party is expected to win a third straight term in April, buoyed by popular Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as well as a weak and divided opposition. Most voters in India would applaud an incumbent victory. But in Bangladesh and Pakistan, where popular opposition parties have been weakened by repression, incumbent parties winning could set the stage for fresh political tensions.

2. Steps Toward Greater Connectivity

South Asia is notorious for being one of the world’s least connected regions. But 2024 could be the year it finally turns the corner. Bhutan disclosed plans this year for a new cross-border rail project with India. Bangladesh, India, and Nepal are working on a new electricity-sharing initiative. And in September, India signed on to a plan for a massive transnational transport project, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.

Bangladesh, with the opening of a large undersea tunnel, and Pakistan, with its inking of a China-funded railroad deal, each took big steps to strengthen connectivity at home. Even Taliban-led Afghanistan got in on the act, with the regime expressing a desire to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

What becomes of these big plans in 2024 will depend on several factors. One is security. China worries about terrorism risks in Afghanistan and Pakistan; if they increase, investment plans could lose momentum. Continued war in the Gaza Strip could spoil India’s plans in the Middle East. Another key factor is the ability to line up necessary financing, especially for the ambitious India-Bhutan railroad plan, which includes new roads and an airport.

Finally, with India’s projects, there is also the risk of bureaucratic delays—an obstacle with previous cross-border infrastructure initiatives.

3. India’s Global South Test

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi waves to the media at the G-20 summit in New Delhi on Sept. 10.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi waves to the media at the G-20 summit in New Delhi on Sept. 10.MONEY SHARMA/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

A year ago, South Asia Brief predicted that 2023 would be India’s year of opportunity. With a surging economy and the G-20 presidency, it was poised to step up its global profile. It did that and more, thanks to its historic lunar landing and its hosting of other major global events, including the Cricket World Cup and a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

In 2024, India will come back down to earth—no longer leading the G-20, the forum that allowed it to officially play the role of bridge between the developed world and the global south—one of New Delhi’s top foreign-policy priorities. Next year, India will look to continue this outreach, but without the benefit of the G-20 leadership platform.

A useful way to gauge New Delhi’s success will be its degree of high-level diplomacy with global south countries—including with smaller, less strategically significant states. Here, India will bump up against China, which also projects itself as a global south leader and enjoys wider influence than India—especially in Latin America, where India has a more modest presence.

Because Beijing’s ties with the West aren’t as strong as New Delhi’s, India can potentially make a more convincing claim to be a bridge to the global south. But it will need to work through potential diplomatic challenges with Western countries following allegations from the United States and Canada about extrajudicial killings in 2023.

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4. The Russia Factor

Most conversations about influential outside actors in South Asia start with China. But 2024 could be the year that Russia makes a bigger play in the region.

For much of this year, Russia was India’s top supplier of crude oil, and it sent its first shipments to Pakistan. In September, Sergey Lavrov became the first Russian foreign minister to visit Bangladesh; in November, three Russian naval ships docked in a Bangladeshi port. Russian naval officers participated in joint exercises with their Bangladeshi counterparts.

Russia is keen to project influence beyond its borders to show that it isn’t weakened or isolated by its war in Ukraine. South Asia is a logical target not only because it’s a friendly neighborhood, but also because Russia can push back there against stepped-up U.S. engagement in the region—which is fueled by intensifying competition with China.

Against this backdrop, one country to watch in 2024 is Nepal, where this year the government expressed strong support for more cooperation with Moscow, including Russian investment in its hydropower sector. With China signaling increased interest in investing in Afghanistan, Kabul may also receive more attention from Russia next year, too.

A deeper Russian footprint in South Asia would intensify already-robust great-power competition in the region, with challenging diplomatic implications for South Asia’s many nonaligned states.

Correction, Dec. 28, 2023: A previous version of this newsletter mischaracterized the current government in Pakistan. Pakistan is being led by a caretaker government until elections on Feb. 8.