Evolving Mexican Cartel C-UAS Capabilities

Weaponized cartel drones are proven to have been fielded since October 2017, with the interdiction of a 3DR Solo quadcopter with a papa bomba (potato bomb) along with four Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación(CJNG) operatives in Valtierrilla, Guanajuato during what was essentially a felony stop. As chronicled at SWJ–El Centro over the years, their deployment in Mexico has proliferated over the last decade, increasing in frequency and spreading geographically throughout the country and also to more cartels, their fragments, and operational units. Cartel counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) capabilities have also developed over this time period as the danger and ‘narco battlefield’ effectiveness of weaponized cartel drones have concurrently increased.

To date, the vast majority of news reports, social media posts, and research products have been solely focused on rapidly evolving cartel weaponized drone capabilities—or more recently, the Mexican and US governmental C-CUAS responses against them—rather than on cartel C-UAS capabilities. This short opinion piece will provide a brief overview of where their capabilities have been trending. Very little public analysis has been published on this phenomena, quite possibly due to limited recognition of its importance as well as a lack of specialized expertise. The author’s expertise is derived from an intimate knowledge of cartel technology and weaponry utilization tracked and analyzed at El Centro and C/O Futures, LLC with which he is associated. This technology and the various tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) related to cartel C-UAS include:

Cope Cages: In two instances, ‘cope cages’—a metal framework attached to a vehicle to provide standoff from drone attacks have been documented with cartel units. One such instance took place with CJNG at Teocaltiche, Jalisco in November 2023 and the other with Cártel de Sinaloa (CdS) at Culiacán, Sinaloa in December 2024. In both cases, the ‘cages’ (or sheets of metal) provide an improvised defense against aerial bombardment rather than kamikaze IED drone attacks, the latter of which are a daily occurrence on the Russo-Ukrainian battlefronts. These appear to be at a utilization dead-end at the moment, given  sporadic use at best, with more of a reliance on active C-UAS and/or full-out IAFV top armoring which is resistant to pipe-bomb type impact bomblets. If and when kamikaze IED dronesshould start to proliferate—especially first-person view (FPV) ones based on racing frames—these defensive stand-off mechanisms may make a reappearance. This is especially likely if the IEDs carried have shape-charge (EFP; explosive formed projectile) designs which can penetrate armor plating.

Drone Guns: For the initial five to six years after the first appearance of cartel weaponized drones, the fielding of radio frequency (RF) emitting drone guns— predominately Chinese commercial systems—were not utilized by the cartels in Mexico. This changed as early usage shifted from IED carrying drones to aerial bombardment and there was an increasing institutionalization as well as a proliferation of use by CJNG and rival cartels. The initial drone gun fielding took place in early 2023 in an engagement between Carteles Unidos (CU) and CJNG, although the social media posting was not initially verified until follow on cartel drone gun imagery began to sporadically appear in more and more cartel social media and news pieces. These directional systems—which emit RF jamming signals—look like oversized futuristic rifles which disrupt the signal between a drone operator’s controller and the drone they are utilizing, resulting in a loss of command and control (C²).

Jammer Systems: These omni-directional RF systems can be worn in backpacks for cartel enforcers, used statically for facility or hardpoint defense, and also placed on vehicles. These generate ‘RF bubbles’ for the forces they are defending and can potentially operate as more powerful variants of drone guns, although without focused directionality. These systems can be viewed as follow-ons to tactical vest worn commercial RF jammers used in the past by cartel kill-teams to electronically isolate their targets, dating back to at least June 2021. Their initial C-UAS fielding is currently murky with reports on their use happening as early as 2024 and their presence in imagery for C-UAS uses well established in cartel social media by mid-2025.

[Note—passive drone detection via RF signal monitoring also exists and represents a passive to active RF (directional or omni-directional) handoff response capability. Both passive and active systems were recovered at a Los Metros (CDG; Cártel del Golfo faction) safe house arsenal bust in Reynosa, Tamaulipas in October 2025 right below the US border].

Improvised Armored Fighting Vehicle (IAFV) Unit TTPs: The operational narco commando units fielded by CJNG, CdS, and related cartels, composed of mounted infantry riding in IAFVs, have implemented early C-UAS doctrinal protocols. Additionally, technological adaptations such as signal inhibitors (EW; electronic warfare units) have been placed on some CJNG IAFVs since 2024, however in situ imagery is scarce on these claims. These man portable and static EW units would simply be either carried on board and/or have their antenna arrays mounted on the exterior of the IAFVs. Very little is known about these narco TTPs with the expectation that they have been improvised under battlefield conditions as the threat environment becomes more dangerous with increasing weaponized drone aerial bombardments. Narco commando C-UAS integration represents a follow-on to earlier drone integration for route recon and later combined-arms attacks.

Aerial Dogfight TTPs: The first (unconfirmed) kinetic cartel drone-on-drone C-UAS incident took place this month (September 2026) in a rural area of Michoacán between CJNG and Gente del R5 of Carteles Unidos. The incident appears in a cartel social media video where in the aggressor CJNG drone rammed the CU drone during an engagement in what appears to be an aerial bombardment against an opposing cartel vehicle. Until more imagery or textual reporting appears of follow-on incidents, this new trend cannot be substantiated. The emergence of cartel drone aerial dogfights would open the door to not only ramming as a C-UAS technique but the eventual placement of shotguns, netguns, and even wires with weights (for rotors entanglement) on the hunter-killer drone systems. The Russo-Ukrainian battlefronts provide a glimpse of the paths where this form of cartel C-UAS may potentially evolve.

As in the past, CJNG appears to be a leading early adaptor of C-UAS just as it has been the premier user of weaponized drones and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the Mexican narco-insurgencies. To date, the primary threat the cartels are fielding C-UAS against are other belligerent Mexican cartels utilizing weaponized drones—not against Mexican or US governmental drones. Of course, concern exists that such blue side drones could now be dealt with in the same manner as cartel drones or even via cartel IED drones, given an earlier incident in which a Mexican military helicopter was targeted by one in Apatzingán, Michoacán in January 2025.

Presently, cartel C-UAS is immature and in no way equates to anything remotely resembling Russo-Ukrainian C-UAS battlefronts capabilities. This is because cartel weaponized drones are for the most part still relatively primitive in their utilization of technology (including artificial intelligence applications), organizational adaption, and TTPs development. Equating CJNG or other cartel weaponized drone capabilities to the level of mass Ukrainian or the Russian deployment in the millions of units, as well as comparing a non-state actor to the economic capacity of larger state-actors, is also a non-starter. Still, we are seeing increasing capability gains by the cartels in both their fielding of weaponized drones and C-UAS, at times at alarming rates given relatively recent fiber-optic C² and chemical payloads appearances. Further, the cartels are gaining valuable lessons learned and at times gaining direct benefits from the Russo-Ukrainian battlefronts via Colombians and other mercenaries trained in these techniques.

Given emerging cartel C-UAS trajectories, it would be prudent for the US government and its military services to actively track such cartel technology integration into narco operational forces as well as into their tactics and doctrine. CJNG, is of course, the cartel to first focus upon in such analysis, but such C-UAS capabilities have since proliferated to other designated narco-terrorist FTOs such as the Cártel de Sinaloa (CdS), Cártel del Golfo (CdG), Carteles Unidos (CU), and others.

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